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INTRODUCTION
Caught between the forces of failed international diplomacy, la-
tent xenophobia, and the bureaucratic lethargy of American criminal
justice, some Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) detainees
have found little reason to retain hope. The results are shocking.
In the spring of 1999, Thanom Posavtoy, a Laotian alien in the
custody of the INS in a San Pedro, California, prison, walked into the
showers and hung himself with his own bed-sheet.' He had become
despondent upon learning that it was unlikely that he would ever be
released.2
Late in the afternoon of Monday, December 13, 1999, five men
wielding homemade knives overtook the prison guards who were es-
corting them from an exercise area to the cellblock at the parish jail
in St. Martinville, Louisiana.3 A six-day hostage stalemate ensued,
with the prisoners demanding only that they be allowed to leave the
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country.-
Between mid-March and early May of 1999, a group of six protes-
tors went on a hunger strike outside the Krome Detention Center
near Miami, Florida.' The strikers were parents of men imprisoned
inside that facility.6 The authorities finally acceded to the protestors
after forty-eight days, releasing four of the detainees.7
These three incidents all trace their dynamic nature to a common
root: each involves prisoners indefinitely detained by the INS. Un-
der the statutory authority of the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), 8 the INS detains
criminal aliens upon the completion of their full penal sentence. 9 A
detainee's imprisonment becomes indefinite when the INS is unable
to effect deportation due to external forces, usually the lack of dip-
lomatic relations with the alien's nation of origin.'l The consequence
is an excruciatingly arduous legal limbo. The "lifer," as she is known
in the colloquialism of the INS, is shipwrecked between the Scylla of
her deportation status and the Charybdis of her detention status.
The INS cannot deport an alien to a country that will not accept her;
and, in many cases, it will not release the detainee back into the U.S.,
based on the perceived risk that she will commit another crime. " INS
detainees represent the fastest-growing segment of the prison popula-
tion in the United States;' 2 among this group are over 3,500 indefinite
detainees. '3
On October 10, 2000, the United States Supreme Court consoli-
dated and granted certiorari14 in two cases reaching disparate results
4 Id. (reporting that the stalemate ended when the United States brokered a deal with Fidel
Castro wherein U.S. authorities agreed to allow the detainees to return to a willing Cuba).
Luisa Yanez, INS Frees Hunger Strikers' Relatives, FT. LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL, May 18,
1999, at lB.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
9 IIRIRA § 303(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (a) (1999).
10 Most frequently, these nations include Cuba, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Other
common groups in the indefinite detainee population include Palestinians, Africans, former
Soviet citizens, Iranians, or any person who is without formal citizenship. See, e.g., Zadvydas v.
Underdown, 185 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 1999) (reporting the plight of a stateless man who was born
in a refugee camp in Germany in 1948 and immigrated to the U.S. when he was eight years
old 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) (6).
12 Mike Clary & PatrickJ. McDonnell, Sentenced to a Life in Limbo, LA. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1998, at
A13 Dan Malone, INS Faulted in Extended Detentions- Agency Defends Lockup Despite Lack of
Charges, DALLAS MORNING NEWs, Dec. 12, 1999, at IA ("The INS said it has deported almost
177,000 people this year. But impasses between the United States and the prisoners' home
countries have, at least temporarily, prevented the agency from deporting an additional
3,500.").
14 Zadvydas v. Underdown, 121 S. Ct. 297 (2000); Reno v. Kim I-o Ma, 121 S. Ct. 297 (2000).
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on the issue of indefinite detention: Zadvydas v. Underdmon'" and Kim
Ho Ma v. Reno. 6 In Zadvydas, the Fifth Circuit ruled that the plain
language of IIRRA t7 authorized the INS to indefinitely detain re-
movable aliens and further ruled that this practice did not Xiolate due
process norms.' 9 Conversely, when considering indefinite detention
in Kim Ho Ma, the Ninth Circuit did not reach the due process ques-
tion, invoking the doctrine of constitutional avoidance.' Instead, the
court construed the governing statute2' to include an implicit stan-
is 185 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 1999).
16 208 F.Bd 815 (9th Cir. 2000).
17 IIRIRA § 305(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (a)(6) (1999). After a brief discussion examining the
rapid evolution of statutory authority for immigration detention, the Fifth Circuit concluded
that 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) (6) was applicable to Mr. Zad)das. 185 F.3d at 286.
18 The Fifth Circuit may not agree with the characterization of Mr. Zadvydas's detention as
indefinite, both because of the facts present in his case and because of tie connotation of the
term. First, the Court goes to great lengths to list unexplored possibilities that the INS can pur-
sue in a firther effort to deport Mr. Zadiydas. 185 F.3d at 291-94. Second, the court believes
that it is inaccurate to characterize the detention as indefinite when there are periodic re-ievs
in place to reevaluate his status. Id at 291 (citing Barrera-Echaarria v. Rison. 44 F.3d 1441,
1450 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc)). Indeed, the court notes that eventually Mr. Zads)das's age
alone will obviate the need to determine his dangerousness to the community or flight risk.
Zadtydas, 185 F.3d at 291 n.12 ("We also note that at a certain point---which Zadv)das may be
approaching-age alone would likely weigh heavily against an INS finding of continued danger
to the community or flight risk."). Presumably, the court is recognizing that Mr. Zadvsdas may
eventually be freed based on the lone fact that the INS has held him for so long that lie has be-
come a fragile, elderly man.
19 Zadtydas, 185 F.3d at 297 ("We hold that the government may detain a resident alien
based on either danger to the community or risk of flight while good faith efforts to effectuate
the alien's deportation continue and reasonable parole and periodic review procedures are in
place."). The court neither explains what constitutes "good faith" efforts to deport an alien,
nor explains how "reasonable parole and periodic review procedures" are interdependent with
such efforts. For instance, it offers no guidance to the INS in the case where their good faith
efforts have been exhausted, but the procedural protections are still in place. Furthermore, by
requiring "good faith" efforts to deport an alien, the court ignores the situation of the vast ma-
jority of lifers whose inability to be deported, unlike Mr. Zadvdias, hinges on tie lack of an ex-
tradition treaty with another nation. Without an extradition treaty, tie INS's efforts to deport
an alien, be they in good faith or not, become meaningless. This obstacle must be addressed by
the State Department. See Hoang Manh Nguyen v. Fasano. 84 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1111 (S.D. Cal.
2000) (observing that "there is no real chance that any of these ['ietanaesel aliens uill be de-
ported in the foreseeable future because no extradition treaty with Viettant exists, and al-
though there have been negotiations to develop a treaty for several years, the State Department
cannot give any reasonable projection as to when, if ever, a treaty %%ill be agreed upon'). Cf.
Hermanouski v. Farquharson, 39 F. Supp. 2d 148, 150-51 (D.R.I. 1999) (explaining that when
the INS was unable to secure travel documents from Poland for the alien in that case, tie prob-
lem was referred to the United States State Department).
0 Kim Ho Ma, 208 F.3d at 823-26.
21 The statue provides that
An alien ordered removed who is inadmissible under Section 1182 of this tide, remov-
able under section 1227(a)(1)(C), 1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(4) of this tide or who has
been determined by the Attorney General to be a risk to tie community or unlikely to
comply with the order of removal, may be detained beyond the removal period and, if
released, shall be subject to the terms of supervision in paragraph (3).
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). The "removal period" is a reference to § 1231 (a)(1), which allows 90
days from the time of the removal order for the INS to effect deportation. 8 U.S.C. §
1231 (a) (1).
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dard of reasonableness. As such, the court ruled that any detention
beyond the original ninety-day removal period violates the statute
when deportation of the detainee is not reasonably foreseeable. 3
The task before the Supreme Court is to reconcile these two ships
passing in the night. By interpreting the statute as including an im-
plicit reasonableness standard, the Kim Ho Ma court avoided directly
engaging the rationale of the Fifth Circuit on the issue of the consti-
tutionality of indefinite detention.24 While many district courts have
addressed the constitutional aspect of this question, 2 5 the Supreme
Court does not have before it a Court of Appeals opinion rebutting
the Zadvydas position, which concludes that indefinite detention is
constitutional. The purpose of this Comment is to draw both from
federal court jurisprudence and constitutional theory to sketch the
strongest argument possible that the INS practice of indefinite deten-
tion of removable criminal aliens violates the Constitution's promise
of due process of law.
This Comment argues that even if the Supreme Court reverses
Kim Ho Ma and rules that the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immi-
grant Responsibility Act of 1996 authorizes indefinite detention, the
Court should hold that this practice is unconstitutional. Part I briefly
examines the history of the legal authority governing the INS practice
of indefinite detention since 1988. Part II examines the argument
that indefinite detention is constitutionally justified. Part III exam-
ines recent district court cases to argue that indefinite detention of
removable aliens violates constitutional norms. Part III also draws
upon John Hart Ely's "representation reinforcing theory" to sketch a
constitutional baseline against which the practice of indefinite deten-
tion is measured. Part IV offers a specific analysis of the consolidated
Zadvydas v. Underdown case, now pending before the Supreme Court.
This comment concludes that indefinite detention of removable
criminal aliens with little chance of deportation violates the Constitu-
tion.
Kim Ho Ma, 208 F.3d at 822 (interpreting the statute "as providing the INS with authority
to detain aliens only for a reasonable time beyond the statutory removal period").
23 Id. at 828 ("Where no removal in the reasonably foreseeable future is possible ... the
statutory language, properly construed, does not authorize indefinite detention of such ali-
ens.").
24 See id. at 826 n.23 ("Although we seriously question the Fifth Circuit's conclusion in [Zad-
vydas] ... we need not reach the constitutional question here.").
25 See, e.g., Thien Van Vo v. Greene, 63 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (D. Colo. 1999) (granting relief to
an excludable alien being held under indefinite detention and concluding that IIRIRA does
not deprive the court ofjurisdiction to hear habeas petitions); Hermanowski v. Farquharson, 39
F. Supp. 2d 148 (D.R1I. 1999) (granting alien's petition for writ of habeas corpus and finding
that his continued indefinite detention order was a violation of his substantive due process
rights); Binh Phan v. Reno, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1149 (W.D. Wash. 1999) (holding that heightened
scrutiny, not judicial deference, applies in determining substantive due process violations of
deportable aliens).
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I. THE ORIGINS OF INDEFINITE DETENTION
A. Mariel Cubans
The line-drawing problems inherent in immigration law have ex-
isted nearly as long as our nation itself."' Federal courts were first
forced to deal with the problem on a massive scale in 1980. At that
time, Fidel Castro allowed 125,000 Cubans to emigrate to the United
States in an event that came to be known as the Mariel Boatlift."7 The
flood of immigrants included a substantial group of aliens who had
been convicted of crimes in Cuba, as well as a significant number of
aliens who would be admitted into the United States and go on to be
convicted of crimes on American soil, rendering them deportable. '
The impact of this event is still being felt today. Indeed, many Mariel
Cubans are currently at the core of the lifer population.
Although diplomatic efforts partially succeeded in returning the
detained Mariel Cubans, many have remained in the United States.""
After it became clear that efforts to deal with the Mariel Cubans as a
group would be thwarted by poor diplomatic relations ith Fidel Cas-
tro, the federal district courts began to face the problem of indefinite
detention.Y' The general consensus of these cases, based both on the
plenary power doctrine32 and the finding that excludable aliens en-
nSee, eg., Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (striking dorn a law that al-
lowed deportable aliens to be put to hard labor pending their departure); Iu re Brooks. 5 F.2d
238, 239 (D. Mass. 1925) (holding that the United States may not detain a deportable alien in
anticipation of the revivaI of diplomatic relations with that alien's home nation); It re Desbois, 2
Mart. (o.s.) 185 (La. 1812) (dealing with the citizenship of aliens who enter the United States
through the admission of a new state).
SSee; g., H.R. REP. No. 96-1218, at 3-4 (1980). riprintd in 1980 U.S.C.C.N. 3810. 3812-13
(describing the Mariel Boadift in a report to Congress); see also Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkin-
son, 654 F.2d 1382, 1384 (10th Cir. 1981) (reporting the plight of one Mariel Cuban).
See, eg., Birgitta I. Sandberg, Is the United States Gotvrnrant Justifird in Indefinztd Detainig
Cuban Exiles in Federal Prisons?, 10 DiCK. J. IN'L L 383, 383-85 (describing the plight of one
man involved in the Mariel Boatift who was detained).
2 See, e-g., id.
5D E.g., id at 383 (reporting the histoty of the Mariel Cubans). In 1984. Fidel Castro agreed
to accept approximately 2,500 of the detained Cubans back into Cuba. Id. at 384. The process
of repatriating the Cubans was interrupted in 1987, but resumed after Cuban detainees rioted
at the Oakdale Federal Detention Center in Louisiana and at the Atlanta Federal Penitentiary.
See id. at 385; see alsoJ. Michael Kennedy & Barry Bearak, The eihrdest tot: WheJoint Could
Blow'-And It Did, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 5, 1987, at I (comparing the detainee riots in Louisiana to
those in Atlanta); Guillermo Martinez, Ml1, Shouldn't Deride Cuba on Human Rjgliw A Hyp-ntreal
U.S. Has Imprisoned Mariel Inmates in a Legal Limbo, NEWSDMY, Dec. 4. 1987. at 97 (arguing that
Mariel inmates in Atlanta should receive individual hearings).
1 See, eg., Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, 44 F.3d 1441 (9th Cir. 1995) (ruling that the United
States Attorney General had statutory authority to indefinitely detain an excludable alien).
The plenary power doctrine can be defined generally as tie notion that. because immi-
gration issues are so central to the nation's sense of self-determination, the judiciary should de-
fer to the popularly-elected legislative branch of government. E.g.. Hiroshi Mototura, fImigra-
tion Law After a Century of Plenary Pouter Phantom Constitutional ,orms and Statutory Interprrtation
100 YALE UJ. 545,547 (1990) ("[T]he doctrine declares that Congress and the executive branch
Feb. 2001]
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joyed a diminished level of substantive due process rights, was that
indefinite detention of Mariel Cubans was not unconstitutional."
B. Legal Status of Excludable Aliens
Criminal aliens subject to deportation have traditionally been di-
vided into two categories for the purposes of legal analysis. First, the
INS detains removable criminal aliens, or those who are present in
the United States and commit crimes." Second, the INS detains ex-
cludable criminal aliens, 35 or those who have never been legally ad-
mitted to the United States, but may be present through the func-
tioning of the entry fiction.6 This Comment will primarily focus on
the first class of aliens-those who are legal permanent residents in
the United States but have been deemed removable. While the plight
of excludable aliens is equally dark, this discussion will describe their
situation only in order to shed light on the relative position of their
removable brethren. It is important, however, to carefully define the
legal status of the excludable aliens because recent judicial justifica-
tions of indefinite detention have rested on the premise that exclud-
able and removable aliens share a common constitutional status. 
7
While the influx of cases concerning excludable aliens remained
steady following the Mariel Boatlift, the constitutional status of ex-
cludable aliens was never wholly clear. Despite significant theoretical
inconsistencies," the majority of courts considering the issue have de-
have broad and often exclusive authority over immigration decisions. Accordingly, courts
should only rarely, if ever, and in limited fashion, entertain constitutional challenges to deci-
sions about which aliens should be admitted or expelled.").
33 See, e.g., Barrera-Echavarria, 44 F.3d at 1450 (stating that "excludable aliens simply enjoy no
constitutional right to be paroled into the United States, even if the only alternative is pro-
longed detention").
IIRIRA § 305, 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (1999).
After the enactment of IIRIRA, this group of aliens is officially referred to as "inadmissi-
ble." See8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1999). For purposes of continuity with the longstanding debate over
the distinction between different statuses of entry, this Comment will use the term "excludable."
The entry fiction allows for the release of excludable aliens into the United States pend-
ing procedural measures aimed at removing them. Thus, while the alien is actually present in
the United States, legally she is considered to be detained at the border. E.g., Rodriguez-
Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1387 (10th Cir. 1981).
37 See Duy Dac Ho v. Greene, 204 F.3d 1045 (10th Cir. 2000) (ruling that because excludable
and removable aliens are the same vis-A-vis the government's interest in removing them from
the country, the two groups are entitled to the same level of due process protection); Zadvydas
v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279, 292 (5th Cir. 1999) (same). This argument is addressed at length
in Part IV below.
38 SeeJean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846,868-77 (1985) (Marshall,J., dissenting). Justice Marshall
persuasively rebutted the notion that excludable aliens are not protected by the Constitution.
First, Justice Marshall pointed out that the Supreme Court had consistently held that exclud-
able aliens are entitled to constitutional protection in other areas, such as criminal prosecutions
and Fifth Amendment takings. Id. Justice Marshall then hypothesized that excludable aliens
would certainly be constitutionally protected from extreme government action, such as sum-
mary execution or a policy forbidding entry to all non-white aliens. Id. Lastly, Justice Marshall
pointed out the implicit inconsistency of the entry fiction by reasserting the established premise
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termined that excludable aliens are not protected by the Fifth
Amendment.s9 According to this view, excludable aliens who cannot
be deported may be constitutionally detained for prolonged periods
of time.4
The legal status of excludable aliens is clearer with regard to pro-
cedural due process rights; however, an equally troublesome applica-
tion exists. The Supreme Court has held that excludable aliens pos-
sess due process rights,4' but courts have generally deferred to the
INS's method of according procedural protection." As discussed be-
low, this rationale-until recently only applicable to excludable ali-
ens-has been extended by some courts to removable aliens."'
C. Statutor Evolution
The INS has statutory authority to deport aliens who commit cer-
tain specified offenses." The legislative trend emerging from Con-
gress in the last twelve years reveals an increasing willingness to ex-
that aliens within our borders are persons for the purposes of te Fifth Amendment. Id. Se
also Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (observing that l[once an alien gains admis-
sion to our country and begins to develop the ties that go wvith permanent residence. his costi-
tutional status changes accordingly"); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202. 210 (1982) (stating that all
persons within the territory of the United States, including aliens unlaufully present. mna% in-
voke the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to challenge actions of the federal govrrnment); Cruz-
Elias v. United States Attorney Gen., 870 F. Supp. 692, 696 n.8 (E.D. Va. 1994) (stating that ex-
dudable aliens ithin our jurisdictional borders are protected by the Fifth ..Anendnlent and
that civil detention for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty).
39 See Shaughnessy v. United States ex L Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1933). Me-isetie stage
that has led to the majority view that excludable aliens do not possess constitunonal rights.
MeAei, however, was a McCarthy-era finding that the petitioner, a legal permanent resident tito
had traveled into Soviet-controlled territory, could be held indefinitely as if 'stopped at the
border." Id. at 215. The Court's language does not make clear whether this particular instance
did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation or whether the Constitution ias uliolly in-
applicable to the petitioner. See Cruz-Elias, 870 F. Supp. at 692. For the most part, later courts
read the language as establishing the latter position, not the former. See, e.g., Gisbert v. United
States Attorney Gen., 988 F.2d 1437, 1442 (5th Cir. 1993) ("[E]xcludable aliens tna, legally be
denied.., due process rights, including the right to be free front detention." (emphasis omt-
ted)).
40 Alvarez-Mendez v. Stock, 941 F.2d 956. 961-62 (9th Cir. 1991); .Anannllah v. Nelson. 811
F.2d 1, 8-9 (1st Cir. 1987); Garcia-Mir v. Smith, 766 F.2d 1478, 1484 (11th Cir. 1985). Se alho
Guzman v. Tippy, 130 F.3d 64, 65 (2d Cir. 1997) (-The majority of circuit courts %%ho hae con-
sidered the question have held that the Attorney General has the atthority to indefinite', de-
tain excludable aliens.").
41 See Wong iTng v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (stating that all persons within the
territory of the United States are entitled to the protections of tie Constituton); se al.o Jean,
472 U.S. at 846 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that excludable aliens are protected In the
Constitution).
See United States er reL Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 54-1 (1950) i'\iateer the
procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is con-
cerned.").
E.g., Cholak v. United States, No. CIVA98-365. 1998 WL 249222, at *8 (E.D. LL Mam 15,
1998); Tran %. Caplinger, 847 F. Supp. 469, 475 (W.D. La. 1993).
For a complete enumeration of the crimes that trigger deportation, see IIRIRA § 321, 8
U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (43) (2000).
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pand administrative power in this area. 5 Beginning with the intro-
duction of the concept of 'aggravated felony' in the Anti-Drug Abuse
Act of 1988,46 congressional legislation has evinced an increasing hos-
tility toward criminal immigrants. First, Congress severely restricted
the judicial review and procedural protections for aliens seeking to
challenge INS decisions.8 The congressional debates over the Immi-
gration Act of 1990 introduced summary deportation procedures as
an instrument to limit the opportunities for aliens to receive judicial
review of their removal orders. 9
Six years later, IIRIRA, which has been referred to by commenta-
tors as "[perhaps] the harshest, most procrustean immigration con-
trol measure in this century,"50 furthered the trend of anti-immigrant
sentiment in Congress. By wholly eliminating Section 106 of the Im-
migration and Naturalization Act, Congress severely limited the fed-
eral judiciary's power to review deportation orders. The restriction
of opportunities for judicial review of orders of deportation has ag-
gravated the problem of lifers. As the number of criminal aliens to
deport grows, so too does the number of lifers among them.
This trend is also apparent in the specific statutory provisions gov-
erning the detention of aliens pending deportation. The class of ali-
ens covered by the statute has expanded through a gradual broaden-
ing of the definition of what constitutes an aggravated felony." Over
time, the class of aliens that will be affected by indefinite detention
has grown, while their procedural protections have eroded. 3 For in-
stance, prior to 1996, the INS was statutorily permitted to detain the
alien for only six months.54 IIRIRA, however, did not foreclose deten-
tion beyond the original time period of administrative detention al-
45 See Brent K. Newcomb, Comment, Immigration Law and the Criminal Alien: A Comparison of
Policies for Arbitrary Deportations of Legal Permanent Residents Convicted of Aggravated Felonies, 51
OKLA. L. REv. 697, 702-04 (1998) (describing legislative intent regarding immigration policy in
the last decade).
46 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988).
47 See Newcomb, supra note 45, at 702-04 (charting Congress's efforts to enact more strin-
gent penalties).
See, e.g., IIRIRA § 304.
49 See Newcomb, supra note 45, at 703 (citing 136 CONG. REc. S17109 (daily ed. Oct. 26,
1990)).
Peter H. Schuck &John Williams, Removing Criminal Aliens: The Pitfalls and Promises of Fed-
eralism, 22 HARv.J.L. & PUB. POLy'367, 371 (1999).
5 Newcomb, supra note 45, at 703.
52 See Newcomb, supra note 45, at 697, 698-701 (tracing the evolution of the statutory defini-
tion of aggravated felonies for criminal aliens).
53 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1999); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (1982) (repealed 1996). For a fuller
explanation, see Randy Toledo, Garcia-Mir v. Meese: Reaffirming the Indefinite Detention of Aliens
in the 1980s, 2 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 653, 679-80 (1987) (explaining the statutory construc-
tion of the Immigration and Naturalization Act). See also Kim Ho Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815, 828
n.25 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that IIRIRA changed the tone of the statutory authorization for
detention from "may not release" to "may detain").
Toledo, supra note 53, at 679-80. This does not mean that there were no lifers prior to
1996, but rather that they enjoyed greater procedural protection.
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lotted for deportation.!5 While the language plainly allows for deten-
tion "beyond the removal period,"56 it does not specify how long de-
tention is authorized after the original ninety-day period ends. It was
precisely this ambiguity that the Kim Ho Ma court seized upon in dis-
allowing the indefinite detention of lifers whom the INS had no rea-
sonable expectation of deporting. 7
Even before the Kim Ho Ma decision, the INS was under pressure
to dispel the ambiguity of the statute and the consequent problem of
lifers. In response to the growing concern of both the press and the
federal courts, the INS adopted interim regulations. ", In substance,
these regulations do no more than add another layer of procedural
due process. The interim regulations mandate, first, that an adminis-
trative review of the alien's case be scheduled before the ninety-day
'removal period' described in 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (a) (1) (A). " The bur-
den for showing a lack of flight risk or danger to the community re-
mains squarely with the detainee.6 If the District Director, or her
designee, determines that the alien has not shown by clear and con-
vincing proof that he is not a danger to the community, the alien will
remain in detention.6' Subsequently, the interim procedures require
a review of the alien's case, with allowances for a face-to-face interview
every six months thereafter. 2
In Chi Thon Ngo v. Immigration and Naturalization Servuie," the
Third Circuit upheld the legitimacy of these interim procedures, rul-
ing that the procedural protection they afford detainees adequately
safeguards their due process rights." A close reading of the court's
language, however, reveals its caution in grantinr this degree of def-
erence to the administrative authority of the INS. ' Indeed, the Chief
55 8 U.S.C,. § 1231(a) (6) now provides, "An alien ordered removed ... who has been deter-
mined by the Attorney General to be a risk to the community or unlikely to comply with the
order of removal, may be detained beyond [ninety days] .... The title of this section, "Inad-
missible or criminal aliens" suggests that one's status as a criminal alien and the finding that the
alien is a "risk to the community" or "unlikely to comply with the order of removal are syn-
onymous in the eyes of the drafters. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) (6). This raises procedural due process
questions in its own right.
56Id.
57 See Kim Ho Ma, 208 F.3d at 822 (construing the statute as -providing the INS uith author-
ity to detain aliens only for a reasonable time beyond the removal period").
5s See Chi Thon Ngo v. INS, 192 F.3d 390, 400 (3d Cir. 1999) (reprinting the interim proce-
dures in an appendix to the reported case).
59 1
60 See id. at 400-01 ("Custody determinations will be made by weighing favorable and adverse
factors to determine whether the detainee has demonstrated by clear and comincing eidence
that he does not pose a threat to the community, and is likely to comply with the removal or-
der."). See also 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 (2000) (listing factors that may be considered by the INS in
making a determination of dangerousness and risk to the community).
61 Chi Thon Ng, 192 F.3d at 400-01.
Id. at 400.
63 192 F.3d 390 (3d Cir. 1990).
U Id. at 399.
65 Id. ("[I]f experience should show that our initial reaction to the Interim Rules or eventual
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District Judge of the United States District Court for the Central Dis-
trict of California ruled that the interim Irocedures "do not meet the
minimum standards for due process." Whatever the impact of
popular attention and judicial intervention, it is clear that the INS
has recognized the newly aggravated crisis of lifers and acted upon it.
As much as the legal status of lifers has been twisted and manipu-
lated, the constitutional implications of indefinite detention remain
an open question. The Supreme Court has never spoken to the con-
stitutional ramifications of indefinitely detaining removable criminal
aliens. The following sections outline the strongest arguments on
both sides of this discussion.
II. THE CONTRARY VIEW: INDEFINITE DETENTION
IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Section A examines the position that some courts have taken in
declining to grant jurisdiction to lifers under the new judicial review
provisions of IRIRA.68 Sections B and C, respectively, explore the
substantive and procedural due process obstacles facing lifers.
A. Jurisdiction
The constitutional status of removable aliens notwithstanding,
some courts have exercised discretion to refuse to hear habeas claims,
based on the jurisdictional limitations of IIRIRA.6 9 While the majority
of district courts considering these claims have little problem exercis-
ing jurisdiction, the Eleventh Circuit has found that IIRIRA prevents
the court from doing so.
In Richardson v. Reno,7" the Eleventh Circuit originally ruled that 8
U.S.C. § 1252(g)7' repealed the federal court's jurisdiction over ha-
permanent regulations was too sanguine, there will be time enough to consider the more ex-
tensive methods suggested by the Phan court.").
In re Indefinite Detention Cases, 82 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1100 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (finding that
the general practice of indefinite detention of deportable aliens violates due process norms,
whether it is a result of interim procedures or the regulations that they supplement).
67 See Hoang Manh Nguyen v. Fasano, 84 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1109 (S.D. Cal. 2000) ("The Su-
preme Court has not addressed whether deportable aliens have a fundamental liberty interest
in being free from indefinite detention."). Of course, with the Supreme Court's grant of cer-
tiorari in Zadvydas v. Underdown, 121 S. Ct. 297 (2000), and Reno v. Kim Ho Ma, 121 S. Ct. 297
(2000), this will not remain true for long.
68 8 U.S.C. § 1252.
See8 U.S.C. § 1252. For instance, this position was adopted in Richardson v. Reno, 180 F.3d
1311 (11th Cir. 1999) [hereinafter Richardson II]. See also Cholak v. United States, No.
CIVA.98-365, 1998 WL 249222, at *4 (E.D. La. May 15, 1998) (summarizing different lines of
cases where courts have both granted and denied jurisdiction).
70 162 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 1998) [hereinafter Richardson I].
71 8 U.S.C. § 12 52(g) provides:
Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other provision of law, no
court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien aris-
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beas petitions by deportable aliens.-' However, following the Elev-
enth Circuit's ruling, the Supreme Court had occasion to interpret
this same provision in another case, Reno v. American-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Committee." In that case, Justice Scalia interpreted §
125 2(g) rather narrowly, holding that "[t ]he provision applies only to
three discrete actions that the Attorney General may take: her 'deci-
sion or action' to 'commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or exe-
cute removal orders.'"'4 As the petitioner's habeas petition challeng-
ing the indefinite nature of his detention did not fall within one of
these three categories, the Eleventh Circuit was forced to reconsider
its opinion in Richardson I in light of the Supreme Court's new statu-
tory interpretation.
Despite Justice Scalia's narrow reading of § 1252(g) in American-
Arab, the Court of Appeals refused to waver from its original position.
In Richardson i,7" the court abandoned its reliance on the provision
interpreted in American-Arab and alternatively invoked another sec-
tion of the Immigration and Naturalization Act 6 to justify its earlier
ruling: "We reach this conclusion for reasons similar to those out-
lined in Richardson I except that we rely on [8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (9)],
rather than [§ 1252(g)], as the expression of congressional intent to
preclude [habeas corpus] jurisdiction in this situation.""
The Eleventh Circuit, it appears, was intent on denying jurisdic-
tion of the petitioner's habeas claim, thereby effectively defying a
clear Supreme Court mandate. Although the Eleventh Circuit's posi-
tion has not been adopted by the majority of district courts, 7 its wll-
ingness to ignore Supreme Court precedent exemplifies the en-
trenchment of courts that have opposed the bids of lifers to escape
indefinite detention.
B. Substantive Due Process
The first question that a court must answer in its substantive due
process analysis is whether the detention is punitive or administra-
ing from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, ad-
j4udicate cases, or execute remo-al orders against any alien under this chapter., Richardson , 162 F.3d at 1341.
525 U.S. 471 (1999).
74 American-Arab, 525 U.S. at 482.
,- 180 F.3d 1311, 1315 (11th Cir. 1999).
,6 The court relied upon 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (9), which provides:
Judicial review of all questions of law and fact, including interpretation and application of con-
stitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to re-
move an alien from the United States under this [subchapter] shall be available only in judicial
review of a final order under this section.
Id.
d-" Richardson , 180 F.3d at 1315.
,- See Cholak v. United States, No. CIV.A.98-365, 1998 WL 249222. at *4 (E.D. La. May 15,
1998) (reporting on the history of this exchange).
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tive.5 Most courts have ruled that a limited detention for the pur-
pose of effecting the civil process of deportation is not punitive, but
rather amounts only to administrative confinement."0 The rationale
holds that because the confinement is imposed to accomplish a le-
gitimate government interest, namely the exercise of the INS's statu-
tory authority to deport criminal aliens, the detainment is merely a
necessary step toward achieving that end.8 Courts have accepted this
justification in cases of confinement lasting up to eight years.
Even if the court finds a legitimate government interest justifying
the detention, it may still find a violation of substantive due process if
the measures taken are excessive relative to the legitimate govern-
ment purpose of confinement or are such that they would "shock
the conscience."8' In the case of excludable aliens, indefinite deten-
tion has often been found constitutional.85 Resting on the theory of
the "entry fiction," courts have held that an alien who has not yet
been granted legal admittance to the United States does not develop
the ties necessary to warrant constitutional protection because they
are legally "detained at the border."s6 This analysis rests on the no-
tion that entrance into the nation is a privilege and not a right that
can be enforced by an alien seeking entry. 7 According to this ration-
ale, the alien who legally stands at our border may not assert any con-
stitutional right to enter, but may only gain the privilege through the
rules established by Congress. Courts applying this doctrine strip the
alien of an ability to assert a fundamental liberty interest, her actual
presence on U.S. soil notwithstanding.ss Without the weight of a
9 See Gisbert v. United States Attorney Gen., 988 F.2d 1437, 1441-42 (1993) (describing the
substantive due process test as applied to indefinite detention of excludable aliens). See generally
Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (laying the foundation for this distinction).
8o E.g., Gisbert, 988 F.2d at 1442.
81 See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038-39 (1984) (noting that a deportation
proceeding is purely a civil action, not intended to punish past acts).
E.g., Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, 44 F.3d 1441, 1443-44, 1450 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding
that the detention of an excludable criminal alien for over eight years, with little chance of de-
portation, was not unconstitutional under substantive due process analysis).
83 E.g., Cholak, 1998 WL 249222, at *8 ("[T]his Court's substantive due process analysis ulti-
mately turns on whether Cholak's detention is excessive in relation to the goals of the
IIRIRA.-).
84 This is a more traditional test of substantive due process and does not often appear when
lifers are at issue. A court, however, will occasionally apply this test when considering indefinite
detention. See Duy Dac Ho v. Greene, 204 F.3d 1045, 1060 (10th Cir. 2000) (BrorbyJ., dissent-
ing); Zadvydas v. Underdown, 986 F. Supp. 1011 (E.D. La. 1997), overruled by 185 F.3d 279 (5th
Cir. 1999). See also Leader v. Blackman, 744 F. Supp. 500, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (quoting United
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987)).
E.g., Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953).
Cf. Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1387 (10th Cir. 1981) (noting that
imprisonment would be considered punitive but for the "euphemistic fiction [that] was created
to accommodate the necessary detention of excludable and deportable aliens while their cases
are considered and arrangements for expulsion are made").
87 Zadvydas, 185 F.3d at 294 (citing Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982)).
8 See Duy Dac Ho, 204 F.3d at 1060 (ruling that "the Due Process Clause does not provide
Petitioners a liberty interest in the right they assert").
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strong due process interest in her favor, the excludable alien is un-
likely to prevail on the balance of her freedom against an), nebulous
risk to the community that may be imputed to her.
Removable legal permanent residents who are being indefinitely
detained would rarely lose this balancing test if found to have the due
process rights afforded by Landon.' Consequently, the strongest sub-
stantive due process arguments justifying indefinite detention of re-
movable aliens have come from courts that equate their constitu-
tional protection with that of excludable aliens."r The Fifth Circuit's
decision in Zadvydas is a leading example of this position.
In Zadvydas, the Fifth Circuit ascribed the same due process rights
to removable aliens as to excludable aliens."' The court looked at the
interests involved in the detention process and determined that be-
cause both excludable and removable aliens are the same, vis-At-vis
their expulsion from the national community pending deportation,
their due process rights in that regard should also be the same." Fur-
ther, the court examined the government interest involved in both
removable and excludable cases and determined them to be the
same. "The need to expel [removable aliens] is identical, from a na-
tional sovereignty perspective, to the need to remove an excludable
alien who has been finally and properly ordered returned to his
country of origin. "4
Having determined that excludable and removable aliens are
identical both in the weight of the due process right asserted and the
governmental interest involved, the constitutional discussion is essen-
tially ended for courts following the Zadvydas rationale. If the indefi-
nite detention of excludable aliens is constitutionally justifiable,
then such is the case for removable aliens as well. "
89 See, eg., Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, 44 F.3d 1441, 1450 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that pro-
longed detention of an excludable alien isjustified).
See Landon, 459 U.S. at 32.
91 Zad ydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279, 290 (5th Cir. 1999); sm also Duy .v DacHo, 204 F.3d at
1059-60 ("We conclude that once a removal order has become final and an alien w'ho uas for-
merly a lawful permanent resident seeks temporary re-entry into die United States, the alien
possesses identical constitutional rights uith respect to his application for admission as an ex-
cludable alien."); Tran v. Caplinger, 847 F. Supp. 469, 476 (W.D. La. 1993) (impl)ing that ad-
ministrative detention cannot be excessive in stating that "the court finds that the detention of
Petitioner is not punishment and does not constitute a violation of Petitioner's right to substan-
tive due process").
92 Zadvydas, 185 F.3d at 294-97.
93 Id. at 294-95.
94 Id. at 296.
See Barrera-Echavania, 44 F.3d 1441, 1449-50 (9th Cir.1995) (rel)ing on the Court's hold-
ing in Shaughnessy v. United States ex reL Mee 345 U.S. 206 (1953), suggesting that 'excludable
aliens simply enjoy no constitutional right to be paroled into the United States, even if te only
alternative is prolonged detention.").
96 This argument is specifically rebutted in Part IN' below.
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C. Procedural Due Process
The only obstacle still impeding the government's policy of in-
definite detention is the constitutional requirement of adequate pro-
cedural protection. In this regard, Zadvydas concedes that there is a
difference between excludable and removable aliens concerning pro-
cedural due process rights. 97 As such, the INS must show that, despite
the plenary power, there are adequate administrative reviews in place
to check the unfettered discretion of the INS District Director.'
There are very few instances where federal courts have found proce-
dural deficiencies in the administrative practice of the INS.9' If the
Director makes a decision on the detention of an alien, it will usually
be afforded tacit deference.'0°
The interim procedures described above in Part I represent a re-
cent development on this front.' The Third Circuit upheld these
procedures as valid in Chi Thon Ngo v. Immigration and Naturalization
Service.10 2  For the time being, at least, the INS seems to have fore-
closed challenges to procedural due process challenges. When
framed in the context of the deference accorded by the plenary
power doctrine and the existing procedural safeguards, the task of
persuading a court to find procedural due process violations is nearly
impossible. That victory for courts seeking to justify indefinite deten-
tion may prove pyrrhic, however, if the momentum of recent district
court cases gains favor.
III. THE CASE AGAINST INDEFINITE DETENTION
Recent district court decisions in Seattle,'03 Rhode Island,'0° Colo-
rado,'05 and California' 6 have given lifers reason to hope that the tide
97 Zadvydas, 185 F.3d at 294. This point highlights the reasoning that the court relied on to
equate the substantive due process rights of excludable and removable aliens. The removable
alien is entitled to "normal" procedural due process rights prior to her final order of expulsion.
Once the deportation has been authorized, however, the court reasoned that she stands with
the excludable alien who has never legally passed our borders in the first place. Zadvydas, 185
F.3d at 294-97.
98 Id.
Research of post-IIRIRA case law has yielded only one such instance: Chi Thon Ngo v. INS,
192 F.3d 390, 399 (3d Cir. 1999) (ruling that the petitioner must be conditionally released be-
cause he has not had adequate regular review of his case to challenge the ruling that he is a
danger to the community).
Schuck & Williams, supra note 50, at 391.
Chi Than Ngo, 192 F.3d at 400; see also supra text accompanying notes 58-62. These proce-
dures were enacted partially to remedy the lack of individualized detention decisions that came
in the wake of IIRIRA.
102 Chi Than Ngo, 192 F.3d at 399.
103 Binh Phan v. Reno, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1149 (W.D. Wash. 1999) (holding that heightened
scrutiny, not judicial deference, applies in determining substantive due process violations of
deportable aliens). The result in Binh Phan was recently affirmed on different grounds in Kim
HoMa v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2000).
104 Hermanowski v. Farquharson, 39 F. Supp. 2d 148 (D.R.I. 1999) (granting alien's petition
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of constitutional interpretation has begun to turn in their favor. The
judges in these cases arguably viewed their role differently from those
in the cases described in Part II. This much is apparent in their will-
ingness to sidestep both the traditional restraints placed on the judi-
ciary by the doctrine of plenary power, as well as the jurisdictional re-
strictions of IIRIRA itself.'17 Although these two obstacles have been
enough to stop some judges facing similar issues before they even
reached the merits of a lifer's case, courts are increasingly likely to
sustain the challenges of lifers.
This section presents the strongest argument that indefinite de-
tention violates the Constitution. Section A examines the similarities
among three recent district court cases articulating these arguments,
focusing on jurisdiction, balancing, and characterizing the govern-
ment's interest. Section B addresses the fundamental tension courts
face when considering indefinite detention issues. In particular,
courts confront "the crystal ball problem," using the same fortune-
telling processes that are used in other exercises of fundamental gov-
ernmental power, such as civil commitment, without any of the same
safeguards. Section C evaluates this debate in terms of one popular
theory of constitutional interpretation.
A. Three Recent Cases
In 1999, three district courts considering habeas petitions brought
by removable criminal aliens determined their continued detention
to be unconstitutional.'Oq Each petitioner was a legal permanent resi-
for writ of habeas corpus and finding that his continued indefinite detention order uas a ioLk-
tion of his substantive due process rights).105 Thien Van Vo v. Greene, 63 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (D. Colo. 1999) (granting relief to exclud-
able alien being held under indefinite detention and concluding that IIRIRA does not deprive
the court ofjurisdiction to hear habeas petitions).
106 Hoang Manh Nguyen v. Fasano, 84 F. Supp. 2d 1099 (S.D. Cal. 2000) (holding that an
alien should be released when removal is not reasonably foreseeable, unless the government
can show that its interests are sufficiently compelling); In re Indefinite Detention Cases, 82 F.
Supp. 2d 1098 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (holding that aliens subject to deportation orders need not ex-
haust administrative remedies before filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus).
107 8 U.S.C. § 1231.
IN See, eg., Richardson v. Reno, 162 F.3d 1338 (1 1th Cir. 1998) (stating that provisions in the
IIRIRA deprive the court ofjurisdiction to hear an illegal alien's habeas claim).
109 Thien Van Vo v. Greene, 63 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (D. Colo. 1999); Binh Phan v. Rena, 56 F.
Supp. 2d 1149 (W.D. Wash. 1999); Hermanowski v. Farquharson. 39 F. Supp. 2d 148 (D.R.I.
1999). Doubtless there are other district court opinions that have ruled similarly when faced
with like circumstances. See, eg., Sombat Map Kayv. Rena, 94 F. Supp. 2d 546, 551-52 (M.D. Pa.
2000) (balancing the likelihood of deportation against tie likelihood of flight risk and die dan-
ger to the community to determine that the lifer's liberty interest outweighs the government
interest in detention); Sengchanh v. Lanier, 89 F. Supp. 2d 1356 (N.D. Ga. 2000) (deciding that
a three year detention raises significant substantive due process concerns); Hoang Manh
Nguyen v. Fasano, 84 F. Supp. 2d 1099 (S.D. Cal. 2000) (following Binh Phan); In re Indefinite
Detention Cases, 82 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (ruling that continued detention without
reasonable likelihood of deportation in the foreseeable future constitutes a violation of substan-
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dent who was convicted of an aggravated felony and found to be re-
movable under IIRIRA." In all three of these cases, the petitioner
was in the custody of the INS for at least two years prior to the court's
decision."' The similarities reach beyond the facts and illustrate
common tenets that comprise the strongest substantive due process
arguments available. The greatest difficulty in reconciling these cases
lies in the fact-specific basis of the rulings."' Despite this potential
stumbli block, a comparison of these three cases reveals common
themes."n
1. Jurisdiction
The first theme that emerges from these cases is the courts' will-
ingness to place themselves under the yoke of'jurisdiction. After de-
scribing the jurisdictional provisions of IIRIRA and the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)," 4 the court in
Hermanowski v. Farquharson remarked, "[n] onetheless, despite this
whirlwind of reform stirred up by Congress, this Court's authority to
review constitutional complaints delivered by a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus has weathered the storm."". The court noted that re-
cent legislation has resulted in some district courts abdicating their
constitutional responsibility to hear habeas petitions"6 and refused to
follow suit.
In the Colorado case, Thien Van Vo v. Greene,"7 the court arrived at
tive due process); Pesic v. Perryman, No. 99C 3792, 1999 WL 639194, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 17,
1999) (requiring an evidentiary hearing in order to properly conduct Phan balancing); Truong
Thanh Tam v. INS, 14 F. Supp. 2d 1184 (E.D. Cal. 1998) (ruling that indefinite detention vio-
lates due process norms). Nonetheless, I will use the three cases listed above for their particular
force.
11 IIRIRA's removal authority is codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252.
One of the petitioners in Binh Phan v. Reno, Phan, was released from his criminal sentence
into INS custody and detained for 20 months before the District Director determined that lie
was not a threat to the community and paroled him. Phan was arrested two months after his
parole on charges that he had cashed a counterfeit check. He was then held in INS custody for
over nine months before his habeas petition was ruled on. See Binh Phan v. Smith, 56 F. Supp.
2d 1158, 1159 (W.D. Wash. 1999) (describing the circumstances surrounding the detention of
the same petitioner as in Binh Phan v. Reno).
112 In this vein, many courts have here deferred to Congress' action under the plenary power
doctrine to abdicate their jurisdiction based on the specific facts before them. See discussion
supra Part II.B; Richardson II, 180 F.3d 1311 (11th Cir. 1999) (reaffirming Richardson I, preclud-
inu urisdiction over habeas petition).
This section will draw upon these themes to outline the strongest constitutional argument
that lifers can make. For a specific analysis of the argument that the lifers in Zadvydas must
make before the Supreme Court, see Part IV below.
114 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255; inserting
new section codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2261-2266).
11 Hermanowski v. Farquharson, 39 F. Supp. 2d 148, 153 (D.R.I. 1999).
16 Id. (comparing its own position to that of the Seventh Circuit in LaGuerre v. Reno, 164 F.3d
1035 (7th Cir. 1998), and the Eleventh Circuit in Richardson v. Reno, 162 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir.
1998)).
117 63 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (D. Colo. 1999).
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the same conclusion, refusing to hold that Congress could do away
with federal district court habeas jurisdiction by implication. After
citing IIRIRA's jurisdiction-limiting language,"' the court stood firm:
"Although this language is of broad sweep, the question remains
whether its intent was to deprive this court of its authority... to hear
and determine fundamental constitutional issues such as the liberty
interest question presented here."" 9 The Thien Iran Vo court con-
cluded that it retained jurisdiction to hear the detainee's claim.'"
In Binh Phan v. Reno, 2' the court did not elaborate, stadng simply
that "[p1etitioners' claims here fall squarely within § 2241."2 This
exercise ofjurisdiction is not inconsistent with Justice Scalia's reason-
ing in Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Commilce.23 As de-
scribed above, when the Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit
disagreed about the scope of IRIRA's jurisdiction-limiting provision,
the Eleventh Circuit found alternative statutory authority for refusing
to hear a habeas petition.2 4 The Eleventh Circuit has held fast to the
position that IRIRA completely repealed the habeas jurisdiction for
deportable criminal alienst2 Thus, each of the district court cases is
circumventing persuasive authority from another circuit to assert
their jurisdiction to hear these claims.
These courts' decisions to exercise judicial review in these cases
also runs against the teachings of the plenary power doctrine. De-
spite bucking this guiding tradition, however, the courts in these
cases did not see their actions asjudicial activism.' ' By acting uithin
their discretion, but refusing to follow the path of least resistance, the
judges' rulings in these cases serve to protect a voiceless constituency
whose relatively small numbers have been forgotten in the landscape
of political maneuvering.'2
118 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (1997) provides:
Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court
shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from te
decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings. adjudicate cases, or to
execute removal orders against any alien under this act.
i.
119 Thien Van V, 63 F. Supp. 2d at 1281.
120 1&
121 56 F. Supp. 2d 1149 (W.D. Wash. 1999).
1 Binh Phan, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1153. The reference to -§ 2241" is a citation to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241, where the federal court's power to hear habeas petitions is codified.
123 525 U.S. 471, 482-83 (1999) (holding that the IIRIRA does not impose a general jurisdic-
tion limitation).
124 See Richardson v. Reno, 180 F.3d 1311, 1314-15 (11th Cir. 1999) (focusing on the lmmi-
gration and Naturalization Act §§ 242(g) and 242(b) (9) found in 8 L.S.C. § 1252).
1. 1&
120 See, e-g., Hermanowski v. Farquharson, 39 F. Supp. 2d 148, 157 (D.R.l. 1999). The Herw.a-
nowski court made clear that it did not view its decision as anything other than a product of well-
settled constitutional doctrine. "This Court does not seek to endow upon deportable aliens new
substantive due process rights or to trail blaze into the terra incognita of this unresohed juris-
prudence." Id.
127 See Mike Glary & Patrick J. McDonnell, Sentacd to a Life in Lirnho, LA. Tl.IES. Sept. 9.
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2. Balancing the Lifer's Interest
Another motif that emerges from these cases is the courts' ap-
proach to balancing. The notion of balancing as an instrument of
judicial subjectivity is now an accepted tenet of a major school of le-
gal scholarship.28  In the context of lifers, the decisions do not ap-
pear political, but rather ideological in nature. In deciding to con-
sider the liberty interests of lifers as seriously as they do, the judges in
these cases have not acted as political arbiters as much as they have
drawn upon constitutional principles of freedom from arbitrary gov-
ernment seizure and deeper beliefs about personal autonomy.
These three district courts arrived at the same general conclusion
in defining the lifer's due process interest for the purposes of consti-
tutional analysis. The Binh Phan court rejected the government's
narrow characterization of the detainees' interest.29 "The issue here
is much more basic-it is simply the right to be at liberty. Put an-
other way, at issue is petitioners' fundamental liberty interest in being
free from incarceration."'" By taking this step, the court promised to
look beyond the bureaucratic and legalistic obstacles that have
stopped other courts and to consider the perspective of the indefinite
detainee.'"' The Thien Van Vo court largely adopted this reasoning
without change, finding that the detainee at issue was suffering from
a violation of his due process rights.
3 2
The Hermanowski court engaged in what was arguably the most
careful balancing analysis of the three cases.'"3 The court outlined a
standard balancing process to evaluate the specific nature of the
lifer's predicament, namely the "length of detention to which the pe-
titioner has already been subjected, the likelihood of deportation,
[and] the potential length of the detention into the future."" These
three factors make up the detainee's position in the balancing equa-
tion. Under this balancing test, the longer the detainee has been in
1998, atAl (describing political haggling over the fate of INS detainees).
2 See generally Elizabeth Mensch, The Histoiy of Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE POLITICS OF
LAW 23, 32 (David Kairys ed., 1998) (summarizing the emergence of legal realism); Paul Butler,
The Case of the Speluncean Explorers: Revisited, Opinion by Stupidest Housemaid, J, 112 HARV. L. REV.
1917 (1999) (utilizing storytelling to dispel the myth of the rule of law); Frank Coffin, Judicial
Balancing. The Protean Scales ofJustice, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 16 (1988) (critiquing judicial decision-
making as unrestrained subjectivism).
,29 Binh Phan v. Reno, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1154 (W.D. Wash. 1999) (noting that "[fireedom
from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process
Clause").
130 Id.
,3, See, e.g., Richardson v. Reno, 180 F.3d 1311 (11th Cir. 1999).
132 Thien Van Vo v. Greene, 63 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1284-85 (D. Colo. 1999). The major differ-
ence in the analysis of Thien Van Vo is that the court felt compelled to evaluate the procedural
due process claim, even after it had found a substantive due process violation.
See Hermanowski v. Farquharson, 39 F. Supp. 2d 148, 157 (D.R.I. 1999).
134 Id. at 159.
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prison, the greater the weight of his due process claim. This awkard
posture makes a detainee's chances of freedom contingent upon how
long he has already languished in administrative limbo."'
In taking this position, these district courts stood in clear conflict
with the Fifth Circuit's Zadzrgdas decision.' s  Most significantly, Binh
Phan and the decisions that followed it refused to equate the due
process rights of excludable and removable aliens. Treating exclud-
able and removable aliens as constitutionally different is in accord
with express Supreme Court language. In Landon v. Plasencia,'" Jus-
tice O'Connor distinguished the two classes of aliens, noting that
"once an alien gains admission to our country and begins to develop
the ties that go with permanent residence, his constitutional status
changes accordingly." In applying this principle to the context of
due process in deportation proceedings,Justice O'Connor noted that
the Court has "developed the rule that a continuously present per-
manent resident alien has a right to due process in such a situa-
tion."i s9
3. Governmental Interest: Punitive or Administrative?
The courts also adopted a similar approach to evaluating the gov-
ernmental interest in these cases. In order to defend the practice of
imprisonment without a criminal conviction, the government first
must show that the detention is not based on a punitive rationale.' °
In the instance of lifers, the government usually overcomes this hur-
dle easily by exploiting the ambiguity of the standard that defines
what constitutes punitive detention. At the commencement of the
detention, the government has clear statutory authority to hold the
criminal alien for the administrative purpose of effecting deporta-
tion."' The government continues to rely on this rationale for the
duration of the detention, and it is unclear at what point the adminis-
trative purpose of the detention becomes outweighed by the de-
tainee's liberty interest.4 2 From the detainee's perspective, short of
As noted above, some courts have found indefinite detention of up to eight vears consutu-
tional in the case of an excludable alien. See Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison. 44 F.3d 1441, 1443-
44, 1450 (9th Cir. 1995).
1 Zadydas v. Underdomn, 185 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding that a removable alien has
no fundamental liberty interest in being released from detention).
137 459 U.S. 21 (1982).
3 Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982).
ls9 Id. at 33. The Zadzgdas court would most likely respond to this language by arguing that
the lifer's final order of deportation has stripped the lifer of any liberty interest that he may
have previously had. See Zadzgdas, 185 F.3d at 296. This argument is addressed specifically in
Part IV.
1 See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 256-257 (1984) (holding that preventatie detention.
however, does serve a legitimate state purpose).
1 See IIRIRA§ 305.
1 See Binh Phan v. Reno, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1149 (W.D. Wash. 1999) (holding that at some
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an express governmental statement of intent to detain based on puni-
tive reasons, it is virtually impossible to prove that the purpose of de-
tention is punitive.143 The Supreme Court has ruled that even in the
case of removable legal permanent residents, deportation proceed-
ings do not constitute punishment even when the consequence is a
prolonged indefinite prison term.
4 4
If the detainee cannot show a punitive intent, the court must de-
termine "whether an alternative purpose to which [the restriction]
may rationally be connected is assignable for it."'45 Given that the
government will not admit a punitive purpose, the court must con-
sider non-punitive rationales as alternatives. Finally, the court will
weigh "whether the detention is excessive in relation to the 'alterna-
tive purpose' proffered.",
46
Presumably, if the detention is not based on punitive grounds, it is
being imposed for administrative purposes. The Binh Phan court dis-
cerned three primary regulatory interests of the INS. 47 The first in-
terest is ensuring that the deportable aliens would actually be de-
ported.'48 Second, and most speculative, is the interest in protecting
the community from potential crime. 149 A third interest, closely re-
lated to the goal of removal, is preventing flight:' as a deportable,
criminal alien, a paroled lifer would have little to lose by fleeing.
Thus, the court's decision depends upon a set of speculations.
First, will the nation to which the criminal alien is to be deported ever
accept him? Second, will the criminal alien pose a danger to the
community? Third, will the criminal alien be likely to abscond if re-
leased pending deportation? The outcome of these predictions re-
veals the fragile difference between a lifer's freedom and an indefi-
nite period of constitutionally justified detention. With the outcome
of these questions as murky as the answers of a street comer fortune-
teller, the cumulative effect of these considerations gives rise to the
"crystal ball problem."
point the detention becomes violative of due process if there is no reasonable likelihood of de-
portation).
143 See, e.g., Tran v. Caplinger, 847 F. Supp. 469, 475 (W.D. La. 1993) ("The legislative history
and text of Section 1252 clearly show that Congress did not provide for detention of aliens con-
victed of aggravated felonies as a means of punishment.").
144 INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1039 (1984) ("The purpose of deportation is not to
punish past transgressions but rather to put an end to a continuing violation of the immigration
laws.").
145 Schag4 467 U.S. at 269 (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69
(1963)).
146 Hermanowski v. Farquharson, 39 F. Supp. 2d 148, 158 (D.R.I. 1999).
147 Binh Phan, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1155-56.
148 Id. at 1155.
149 Id. at 1156.
150 Id.
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B. The Crystal Ball Problem
Upon establishing that the purpose of the detention is not puni-
tive, the government typically asserts three administrative interests in
detaining the lifer: to effect deportation, to protect the community
from danger and to prevent flight.' The weight afforded these gov-
ernmental interests will decide the outcome of the lifer's constitu-
tional balancing inquiry. This section will address these interests in
turn, concluding that each fails to justify a sentence of indefinite de-
tention.
1. Administrative Purpose of Effecting Deportation
The first aspect of the "crystal ball problem" suggests at least part
of the reason that the American media has found the problem of lif-
ers so interesting. To hinge freedom from detention upon the likeli-
hood of deportation places lifers in the awk-ard posture of having
their freedom depend on United States foreign policy. Given that
lifers in the United States are from only a handful of foreign na-
tions,15 ' evaluating their likelihood of deportation is relatively
straightforward. These predictions can be reduced to a question of
foreign policy and relationships with nations unfriendly to the United
States. In the absence of favorable diplomatic relations, there is little
chance that the INS will successfully effect deportation.
For instance, in situations where the urgency falls short of the St.
Martinville incident, 53 Cuba has very rarely cooperated with INS ef-
forts to repatriate deportable Cuban aliens.' Likewise, the lifers at
issue in a recent California case suffered because the United States
lacks an extradition treaty with Vietnam.' The court exhibited a
heightened sense of realism when it observed:
there is no real chance that any of these aliens will be deported in the
foreseeable future because no extradition treaty with Vietnam exists, and
although there have been negotiations to develop a treaty for several
years, the State Department cannot give an reasonable projection s to
when, if ever, a treaty will be agreed upon.
5 SeeThien Van Vo v. Greene, 63 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1285 (D. Colo. 1999) (enumerating ie
"rational reasons" for continued detention of aliens convicted of an aggregated felony).
15 Most frequendy, these nations are Cuba, Vietnam, Cambodia. and Laos. Also common
among the ranks of the lifers are Palestinians, Africans, former Soiet citizens. Iraniams, or am
person who is without formal statehood. See supra text accompan)ing note 10.
1 See supra note 3 and accompanying text (recounting the incident in u ich prisoners took
guards hostage for six days before being allowed to return to Cuba).
See Sandberg, supra note 28, at 384-85 (describing the difficulties of negotiating die re-
turn of the Mariel Cubans).
155 See Hoang Manh Nguyen v. Fasano, 84 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1111 (S.D. Cal. 2000) (holding
that when deportation is not likely in the foreseeable future, die burden shifts to die goern-
ment to show that continued detention is rarranted).
156 Id
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For the purpose of illustrating the "crystal ball problem," the
Vietnam example is poignant. While the United States has bargained
with the Vietnamese government for years, still no agreement exists
to repatriate their citizens. Absent a sea-change in our diplomatic re-
lations with their home government, it is unlikely that Vietnamese lif-
ers will be deported in the foreseeable future. Thus, for many de-
tainees, the "crystal ball problem" is moot: because there is no
realistic possibility that they will be repatriated, speculation is futile.'
7
In light of this reality, the governmental interest appears increas-
ingly shallow. While the INS is authorized to hold detainees for the
purposes of effectively executing deportation," 8 in the case of many
lifers, this rationale is meaningless. "Once it becomes evident that
the deportation is not realizable in the future, the continued deten-
tion of the alien loses its raison d'etre."59
The Supreme Court has addressed such fundamental shifts in the
purpose of confinement in other contexts. Due process requires
that, "the nature and the duration of commitment bear some reason-
able relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed."'6°
If the purpose for detention becomes meaningless, the Court has
found that the detention "could not constitutionally continue after
that basis no longer existed." In the many cases involving detainees
from countries without extradition treaties with the United States, the
government's administrative purpose of effecting deportation is
without merit. Gazing into the foggy future, the government's first
justification for indefinite detention is undermined by its own ambi-
guity.
2. Administrative Purpose of Protecting the Community from Danger
The second part of the "crystal ball problem" is more complex,
both because its outcome is more contingent on the particular facts
of the case and because the speculation about future behavior is
more tentative. The Supreme Court has accepted the practice of de-
taining U.S. citizens in the interest of protecting public safety. 62 In
17 It should be noted that recent diplomatic developments between Vietnam and the United
States foreshadow a brighter day. See, e.g., A.J. Langguth, Editorial, The Forgotten Debt to Vietnam,
N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 18, 2000, at A19 (noting that President Clinton's visit to Vietnam could "lay
groundwork for more progress in what is already a much improved relationship").
15 8 U.S.C. § 1231.
- Truong Thanh Tam v. INS, 14 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1192 (E.D. Cal. 1998) (quoting Zadvydas
v. Caplinger, 986 F. Supp. 1011, 1026-27 (E.D. La. 1997), overruled by Zadvydas v. Underdown,
185 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 1999)).
160 Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368 (1983) (authorizing the institutionalization of a
defendant who was acquitted on the basis of mental illness only as long as the acquittee contin-
ues to be mentally ill or a danger to herself or others).
6 O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975) (holding that a state could not con-
tinue to detain a harmless, mentally ill person).
162 See, e.g., Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 279-81 (1984) (allowing for the detention of"dan-
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1987, the Court summarized: "We have repeatedly held that the
Government's regulatory interest in community safety can, in appro-
priate circumstances, outweigh an individual's liberty interest."' The
closest analogy to preventative detention of lifers is the detention of
populations determined to be mentally incompetent"' or chronic
sexual offenders,16 who are deemed to be a threat to society."
"In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or
without trial is the carefully limited exception. " '6" The terms of this
exception should apply equally to both the mentally incompetent
and the criminal alien, but they do not." At stake for both groups is
the ultimate liberty interest-the interest in being free from bodily
restraint imposed by the government.
Despite this similarity, circuit courts have defended the differen-
tial treatment of the mentally incompetent and lifers. In Gisbert v.
United States Attorney Genera4'6" the Fifth Circuit distinguished the
situation of the dangerous mentally ill from lifers on two separate
grounds. First, the court differentiated the two groups as citizens and
non-citizens. Second, the court contrasted the plight of those de-
tained in psychiatric facilities from those held in jails. '" An argument
can be made that those distinctions work in favor of the lifer, not
against her.
First, the distinction between citizen and non-citizen is not rele-
vant to the case of indefinitely detained, removable aliens. WhIiile it is
true that regarding aliens, "Congress regularly makes rules that would
gerous" juvenile delinquents pending tria); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520. 531-34 (1979)
(authorizing detention pending trial where the accused is considered to be a flight risk); Ad-
dington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979) (sanctioning the detention of criminad defendants
who are incompetent to stand trial and have been found to be dangerous).
1 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987) (upholding the constitutionality of the
Bail Reform Act of 1984, which allows a federal court to detain a person arrested pending trial
if there are no release conditions that will reasonably assure the safety of tile community).
164 SeeAddington, 441 U.S. at 426 (noting that the state has police power authoritv "to protect
the community from the dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally ill".
See Kansas %. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (dealing %ith tie commitment of "sexually
violent predators").
16 The analogy of pre-trial detention may seem appropriate, but given the temporal consid-
erations at stake here, the more apt analogy would be that of a prisoner already tried and con-
victed, but awaiting a sentence. In this case, it is a sentence that may never come. See Debora
Ann Gorman, Note, IndefiniteDdention: The Supreme Court's Inartion Prlongs the 1l141 of Detamed
Aliens, 8 GEO. ILMIGR. L.J. 47, 61 (1994) (noting that the deportable aliens ma% be subject to
indefinite detention due to the "limitless discretion" given to tie Attornei General).
167 Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 83 (1992). Fouha has been distinguished as inapposue
from the situation of criminal aliens because it dealt uith citizens in psychiatric finclities. See
Gisbert v. United States Attorney Gen., 988 F.2d 1437,1441 n.6 (Sth Cir. 1993).
16S The Zadtgdas court would distinguish tie two groups on tie basis that removable criminal
aliens have been ordered permanently expelled from our borders. Zadv~das v. Underdo-t,
185 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 1999). As is argued in Part IN' below, this distinction does not mn that
the removable alien is without due process rights.
169 988 F.2d 1437 (5th Cir. 1993).
170 Gisbert 988 F.2d at 1441 n.6.
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be unacceptable if applied to citizens,"'7' the interest asserted here
does not fall within that universe of congressional power. The inter-
est asserted by lifers may be described as the right to be at liberty,"
which is a fundamental due process right for citizens and aliens alike,
and one that removable aliens have by virtue of their presence in the
United States. 173  For the purpose of fundamental liberty interest
analysis, a distinction based on citizenship shows only that removable
aliens enjoy similar constitutional protection.
The second tenet of the Gisbert argument posits that because lifers
are held in jails, their situation is distinct from that of the mentally
incompetent. A psychiatric facility is at least suitable for the patients
that it serves; the patients have been placed there by the court to re-
ceive the services they need. Upon a finding that a patient is incom-
petent, it is legally appropriate that she be institutionalized. In the
case of removable aliens, however, their legal status dictates that they
should be in their "native" countries; local and federal detention cen-
ters serve only as a second best alternative. 4
Jails, then, do not justify a diminished due process interest for lif-
ers, relative to the mentally incompetent. Indeed, the second-best
nature of the legal posture requires that the alien's interest in bodily
freedom be afforded more weight. The lifer's interest in being freed
once the administrative basis of their detention evaporates is even
stronger than in other contexts where the Supreme Court has defini-
tively affirmed this resolution. 75 The Fifth Circuit's effort in Gisbert to
distinguish removable criminal aliens from institutionalized patients
is thus unpersuasive.
In other respects, however, the similarities between the two
groups are striking. Given that the government's inability to effect
deportation creates the absence of a cogent administrative justifica-
tion for detention,' 76 both the lifer and the patient with a mental ab-
normality are detained by the government under the same rationale.
Both groups can be held following the completion of their penal sen-
tence for the purpose of protecting the general public from potential
171 Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976) (discussing an alien's eligibility for participation
in a federal medical insurance program).
172 Binh Phan v. Reno, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1154 (W.D. Wash. 1999) ("The issue here is
much more basic-it is simply the right to be at liberty. Put another way, at issue is petitioners'
fundamental liberty interest in being free from incarceration.").
13 See Duy Dac Ho v. Greene, 204 F.3d 1045, 1062 (10th Cir. 2000) (Brorby, J., dissenting)
(arguing that removable aliens enjoy a right to fundamental constitutional protections by quot-
ing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992), when stating that "[Il]iberty is one of those basic
rights enjoyed by all 'persons' as freedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of
liberty protected by the Due Process clause").
174 The term "native" country is used loosely, because many lifers have spent the majority of
their lives in the United States.
175 See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 82-83 (emphasizing that the detention found constitutionally per-
missible was strictly limited in duration in United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 7,17 (1987)).
176 See supra Part III.B (discussing the "crystal ball problem").
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danger. In the case of chronic sexual offenders, however, the Su-
preme Court has insisted that the detention be based on a minimal
degree of scientific certainty. Lifers, by contrast, are left to the vaga-
ries of the INS bureaucracy.' Yet, their ultimate fate is the same: a
de facto life sentence as long as the underl)ing condition-in one
case, mental aberration, in the other, foreign policy-remains un-
changed. A comparison of the procedural protections for each of
these groups reveals the disparity in treatment that lifers receive.
Before a mentally ill patient is institutionalized, he must be found
to suffer from a cognitive, psychological, or developmental disorder
that creates a heightened risk of danger.'tm In order for this finding
to legally warrant indefinite commitment, it must be determined that
the detainee lacks the ability to comprehend the moral weight or the
broader social consequences of her actions.'-" In these cases, the
court can point to scientific evidence justifying its conclusion that but
for institutionalization, a mentally incompetent patient would be a
danger to the community.
Similarly, the Supreme Court has approved of statutes that allow
for the non-penal detention of chronic sexual offenders only where
the evidentiary threshold is sufficiently rigorous. In Kansas v. Hen-
dricks,80 for example, the Supreme Court upheld a state involuntary
commitment statute because it required a clear, scientific resolution
of the "crystal ball problem." In that regard Justice Thomas %%Tote,
"[t]he statute thus requires proof of more than a mere predisposition
to violence; rather, it requires evidence of past sexually violent behav-
ior and a present mental condition that creates a likelihood of such
conduct in the future if the person is not incapacitated."
'K'
The record in Hendricks illustrates that in order to prove that the
prisoner presented a future threat, the state had to meet a very high
burden of proof. In that case, Kansas presented evidence of future
dangerousness from the chief psychologist at a state hospital, the re-
port of a licensed clinical social worker specializing in treating male
sexual offenders, testimony from the victims, and a statement from
the patient himself stating that even after his prison sentence, he
"cannot control the urge" to molest children.' " Given the weight of
1 See Hoang Manh Nguyen v. Fasano, 84 F. Supp. 2d 1099. 1113 (S.D. Cal. 2000) (finding
fault with the use of criminal history alone tojustif, a finding of dangerousness).
178 See, e-g., Foucha, 504 U.S. at 82-83 (discussing the high burden of proof necessary tojustif
indefinite confinement to a mental institution).
19 See i&. at 80 ("The State may also confine a mentally ill person if it shows 'by clear and
convincing evidence that the individual is mentally ill and dangerous.'" (citing Jones V. United
States, 463 U.S. 354, 362 (1983))).
ISO 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (considering the constitutional validity of a Kansas statute that man-
dated detention for sex crime offenders following the completion of their criminal sentence if
they are found to present a danger to the public).
Id. at 357 (stating the opinion of the Court on the evidentiary standard).
192 Id at 355 n.2, 360 (noting the vast amount of scientific evidence presented against the
defendant).
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this evidence, the Supreme Court had little trouble agreeing that the
patient would present a danger to the public if released.'
Relative to this standard, the lifer receives little procedural protec-
tion, despite a similar procedural posture. After the first ninety days
of detention, the INS is required to conduct a review of the criminal
alien's situation. 184 However, this review is not uniform throughout
the country and lacks substantive guidelines for determining
dangerousness. 5 In effect, low-level INS bureaucrats are using their
own discretion to determine whether or not the lifer poses a threat to
the community.'6
The insufficiencies of this haphazard method of determining
dangerousness are apparent when measured against the standards
required by Supreme Court precedent. In United States v. Salerno,
the Court cited with approval an enumeration of procedural protec-
tions for detainees held for administrative purposes. These included
the lifer's right to representation, to testify in her own defense, to a
hearing before a neutral decision-maker, and the right to appeal the
administrative decision.'ss The typical INS procedure includes none
of these measures. Indeed, perhaps the most egregious feature of
INS detention proceedings is that the lifer'sjailer is also his judge. 9
Beyond the problems related to the structure of the detention
process, the INS custody review also suffers from a lack of evidentiary
standards. Even when the INS's own procedural rules are properly
followed, the determination of a lifer's dangerousness is still almost
entirely based on her history and the degree to which it establishes a
predisposition of violence.' The guidelines are wholly without a
18 Id. at 360 (noting that the level of evidence necessary to prove the prisoner mentally ab-
normal had been met).
18 See Chi Thon Ngo v. INS, 192 F.3d 390, 400 (3d Cir. 1999) (reprinting from the INS in-
terim procedures, "Pursuant to the provisions of 8 C.F.R. § 241.4, the District Director will con-
tinue to conduct a custody review of administratively final order removal cases before the
ninety-day removal period ... expires for aliens whose departure cannot be effected within the
removal period").
18 See Phuong Le, Judges Say INS Detention Can't Last Indefinitely, SEA"rLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER,July 10, 1999, at Al (discussing an example of the subjectivity of review).
18 See Chi Thon Ngo, 192 F.3d at 400 ("The District Director may delegate custody decisions to
the level of Assistant District Director, Deputy Assistant District Director, or those acting in their
capacity.").
87 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (upholding, against a due process challenge, an act requiring exten-
sive protections for people detained prior to trial).
See Thien Van Vo v. Greene, 63 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1287 (D. Colo. 1999) (discussing the
rights that should be afforded detainees).
89 In fact, INS officials who make these determinations have gone on record as stating their
own belief that they are not impartial decision makers. See Thien Van Vo, 63 F. Supp. 2d at 1287
("Indeed, Respondent Greene acknowledged he was not a neutral decision maker.").
190 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 (2000). The guidelines suggest that the factors considered in determin-
ing dangerousness may include, but are not limited to: "the nature and seriousness of the
alien's criminal convictions; other criminal history; sentence(s) imposed and time actually
served; history of failures to appear for court (defaults); probation history; disciplinary prob-
lems while incarcerated; evidence of rehabilitative effort or recidivism; equities in the United
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mechanism to even evaluate the lifer's "present mental condition," as
is required in the case of the sexual offender?9  The INS thus re-
solves the "crystal ball problem" without gazing into the future, but
rather by looking only to the pasL'
This lack of an evidentiary standard has disturbed some federal
courts. For example, in Hoang Manh Nguyen v. Fasano,*3 Judge Keep
of the Southern District of California criticized the lack of substantive
guidelines for determinations of dangerousness. He noted that the
decision to continually detain each of the petitioners "appears to
have been predicated solely on each Petitioner's criminal history." "
Rejecting this approach,Judge Keep found that "[a]n alien's criminal
history does not militate a finding of danger to the community. ""'
Because he could find no principled basis upon which determina-
tions of dangerousness were made, Judge Keep strongly disapproved
of this ad hoc system of justice. Indeed, despite the fact that each of
the petitioners had received their proper "file review" by the INS to
consider dangerousness, Judge Keep concluded that "[i]t is... un-
clear to the court... that Petitioners pose a danger to the commu-
nity.
" 19
The federal reporters are filled with similar condemnations of INS
shortcomings in reviewing lifer cases. The In re Indefinite Detention
Cases court noted that "the INS has not meaningfully and impartially
reviewed the Petitioner's custody status."97 Likewise, in Binh Phan,
the court concluded that "[t]he absence of any individualized assess-
ment or consideration of the petitioners' situations in light of the
pertinent factors set forth in the regulations violates their procedural
due process rights." '"
States; and prior immigration violations and history." It.
191 See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357-58 (1997) (noting that "a finding of
dangerousness standing alone is ordinarily not a sufficient ground upon which to justify indefi-
nite involuntary confinement").
19 Any possibility that a criminal alien has reformed her %%ays is thus ignored, in effect fur-
ther punishing the lifer for past acts for which she has already served a full penal sentence. The
Zadvydas court noted that the whole rationale behind this immigration scheme rests on the no-
don that the American public does not have to tolerate a similar level of risk uvith regard to
criminal aliens. See Zadv.ydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279. 296-97 (5th Cir. 1999). While this
reasoning certainly justifies the removal of criminal aliens as an initial matter. Congress in no
way anticipated or balanced this interest against the possibility that the result of the statutory
scheme would be a potential life sentence in prison for criminal aliens who have completed
their penal sentence.
193 84 F. Supp. 2d 1099 (S.D. Cal. 2000).
194 Id. at 1113.
195 1I d.
196 Id. at 1111.
197 In re Indefinite Detention Cases, 82 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1099-1100 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (con-
demning the failure of the INS to meet even the minimum procedural standards set forth in
their own interim procedures).
193 Binh Phan v. Reno, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1157 (W.D. Wash. 1999) (expressing concerns
about the quality of review that INS affords detainees).
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When compared to the procedural and evidentiary standards for
committing both the mentally incompetent and the chronic sexual
offender, the typical lifer receives only the benefit of a perfunctory
INS review. Unfortunately, the freedom at stake is just as significant.
The average removable criminal alien, while certainly guilty of at least
some anti-social behavior, does not pose the same threat to public
safety that a typical chronic sexual offender or patient with unstable
mental illness does. Yet, the process afforded these groups of detain-
ees entails a more rigorous effort to establish their dangerousness to
a degree of scientific certainty. Indeed, in many cases, lifers are de-
tained for past offenses that are relatively minor.
3. Administrative Interest in Preventing Flight
Lastly, the INS typically argues that it is detaining a lifer for the
legitimate administrative purpose of preventing him from abscond-
ing.20 The argument posits that a released removable criminal alien
will have little to lose by escaping from the grasp of authorities, mak-
ing deportation impossible even if a repatriation agreement were
reached. The legitimacy of this interest is contingent upon the possi-
bility that repatriation will become possible in the foreseeable future,
an unlikely prospect in light of the political realities complicating the
establishment of extradition agreements. More importantly, this in-
terest fails even on its own terms.
As an initial matter, the government does not have to incarcerate
a lifer in order to ensure his availability. The INS has narrower
measures at its disposal to secure this interest."" In particular, a vari-
ety of supervised parole measures, such as those used in the non-
immigration criminal context, provide a viable alternative to incar-
ceration. In fact, the Code of Federal Regulations provides specific
guidance in this area.02 The minimum amount of supervision under
8 C.F.R. § 241.5 includes:
(1) A requirement that the alien report to a specified officer periodically
and provide relevant information under oath as directed; (2) A require-
9 See Immigration and Naturalization Service Decisions Impacting the Agency's Ability to Control
Criminal and Illegal Aliens: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims of the House
Committee on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 66-73 (1999) (statement of Bishop Nicholas DiMarzio,
Auxiliary Bishop of Newark, NewJersey and Chairman of the Bishop's Committee on Migration
for the United States) (reporting on his work with an immigrant in his diocese who was being
deported for petty larceny); Varied Routes Led Immigrants to INS Custody, SEATrLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER,June 17, 1999, at BI (reporting that some of the petitioners in the consolidated
Binh Phan case were being held for crimes of "moral turpitude," such as theft and receipt of
stolen property).
200 See Thien Van Vo v. Greene, 63 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1285 (D. Colo. 1999) (discussing the
government's interests in detaining aliens to prevent flight).
201 See 8 C.F.R_ § 241.5 (2000) (listing conditions to be attached to prisoner's release includ-
ingorder of supervision, posting of bond, and employer authorization parameters).
See id.
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ment that the alien continue efforts to obtain a travel document and as-
sist the Service in obtaining a travel document; (3) A requirement that
the alien report as directed for a mental or ph)sical examination or ex-
aminations as directed by the Service; (4) A requirement that the alien
obtain advance approval of travel beyond previously specified times and
distances; and (5) A requirement that the alien provide tie Service ith
written notice of any change of address on Form AR-11 within ten days of
203the change.
This provision illustrates the congressional belief that lifers are no
more likely to flee than criminal defendants facing trial. Reflecting
this insight, the court in Hoang Manh Nguyen v. Fasano could not un-
derstand "why the procedures set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 241.5 are not suf-
ficient to prevent Petitioners from absconding.'"' Given the funda-
mental liberty interest at issue, the government must achieve its
stated purpose through the narrowest means available.4v' Indefinite
detention of all lifers oversteps these bounds.
In sum, an examination of the governmental interests for the in-
definite detention of removable criminal aliens reveals a series of
empty formalisms. The INS cannot continue to justify prolonged
confinement of these long-term U.S. residents based only on the
shadow of meaningful administrative purposes. "  If the administra-
tive purpose is not reasonably attainable or may be achieved through
means more narrow than imprisonment, the INS must release the de-
tained lifer.
C. Toward a Consistent Constitutional Theoy
While the concerns raised by the "crystal ball problem" have
proved difficult to reconcile across the expanse of the federal judici-
ary, the cases discussed above are consistent with the representation
reinforcing theory of constitutional interpretation." Articulated by
John Hart Ely and buildin. upon Justice Harlan Fisk Stone's famous
Carolene Products footnote," the representation reinforcing theory
8 C.F.R. § 241.5(a).
Hoang Manh Nguyen v. Fasano, 84 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1111 (S.D. Cal. 2000).
See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993) (stating that governmental burdens on
fundamental liberty interests must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental in-
terest).
2 Surely, the three administrative purposes described above are meaningful for removable
aliens whose deportation is imminent. In the case of lifers, houver, the administrative pur-
poses possess only a shadow of their originally intended meanings.
M See JOHN HART ELY, DFMOCRACY AND DI5TRL;ST: A THEORY OFJLUDIcIL-. RE%1EW 73-77. 87
(1980) (discussing the "participation oriented" theory of constitutional interpretation).
See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (suggesting that
heightened judicial scrutiny is appropriate when -legislation which restricts those political pro-
cesses which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation" or
when "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities ... tends to seriously curtail the opera-
tion of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities7); see alo
Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carotene Products, 98 HARV. L RE%,. 713 (1985) (re-examining Cao-
Feb. 2001]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LA[ W
laid the foundation for the contemporary debate over judicial re-
straint.'" As applied in the context of indefinite detainees, the repre-
sentation reinforcing theory would require the judge to use her role
to protect the voiceless lifer minority from majoritarian forces.2 t °
Indeed, Ely could very well have been writing of the lifers them-
selves when he urged judges to vindicate the rights of minorities
when "representatives beholden to an effective majority are system-
atically disadvantaging some minority out of simple hostility or a
prejudiced refusal to recognize commonalities of interest, and
thereby [are] denying that minorit the protection afforded other
groups by a representative system."2 1 If one accepts that removable
aliens are afforded the same due process rights as citizens, it is diffi-
cult to imagine what, other than xenophobic hostility or a "preju-
diced refusal to recognize commonalities of interest," underlies the
collective government apathy toward the plight of lifers. Is it con-
ceivable that U.S. citizens would ever be subjected to this draconian
legal limbo?
The principal argument that the representation reinforcing
model is inapplicable comes from advocates of the plenary power
doctrine. This theory posits that issues of immigration are uniquely
insulated from judicial interference, because the elected branches of
government must have complete control over an issue so central to
the national sense of self-identity.
212
The argument for the plenary power doctrine is especially weak in
the cases of removable aliens, however. The traditional justification
for the plenary power doctrine is that immigration policies deeply af-
fect the nation's foreign relations and national identity, thus making
213judges particularly unsuited to act in this area. In the case of re-
lene Products in the context of modern jurisprudence).
See, e.g., Robert N. Clinton, Original Understanding, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of
'This Constitution,'72 IoWA L. REv. 1177, 1273-74 (1987) (exploring the tension between the
representation reinforcing theory and other methods of constitutional interpretation).
The representational reinforcing theory has been applied to the problem of indefinite
detention before. See Gorman, supra note 166 at 63-64. In the post-IIRIRA era, the obligation
of the judiciary to uphold the interests of those absent from the majority political process has
become even more important, because IIRIRA further eroded the procedural due process af-
forded to criminal aliens. As a result, the detainee is more exposed to the will of the majority,
without the same protection against error that accompanies other government actions. As with
mostjudicial balancing, the constitutional theory is borne out in the respective weights that the
judge chooses to assign to the opposing interests. As will be discussed below, Binh Phan v. Reno,
56 F. Supp. 2d 1149 (W.D. Wash. 1999) offers a good illustration of the representation reinfor c-
ing theory at work.
2 ELY, supra note 207, at 103.
22 See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 84 (1976) ("[I]t is the business of the political
branches of the Federal Government, rather than that of either the states or the Federaljudici-
ary, to regulate the conditions of entry and residence of aliens."); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787,
792 (1977) ("[O]ver no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more com-
plete." (quoting Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909))).
213 See INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999) ("Thejudiciary is not well positioned
to shoulder primary responsibility for assessing the likelihood and importance of such diplo-
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movable criminal aliens, however, concerns about foreign relations
and national identity are not implicated. The government objectives
of effecting deportation, preventing harm to the American public,
and preventing flight do not involve foreign relations or nationalities.
As the Binh Phan court noted, "[i] ndefinite detention of aliens or-
dered deported is not a matter of immigration policy- it is only a
means by which the government implements Congress's directives.
" 
-14
As such, the principles underlying the plenary power doctrine are not
implicated. As if heeding the call of the representation reinforcing
model, the Binh Phan court found that indefinite detention impli-
cated fundamental notions of liberty and thus applied a heightened
degree ofjudicial scrutiny to the actions of the INS.211
More generally, the plenary power doctrine is increasingly disfa-
vored in modern jurisprudence. Commentators have observed that
regulation of immirtion law exists in a sort of "phantom" or sub-
constitutional state.' Consequently, internal inconsistency and ex-
ternal criticism mark the application of this body of law. The plenary
power doctrine has been persuasively attacked by scholars as an ar-
chalc holdover from the era of Plesy v. Ferguson.
The best example of the plenary power doctrine's basis in out-
moded beliefs may be found in the Zadvydas decision itself.2"' After
concluding that Mr. Zadvydas is not asserting a fundamental liberty
interest, the Court goes on to argue that the plenary power, as ex-
plained in Wong Wing,2 '9 may overcome the constitutional rights of
aliens. In doing so, the court quotes W1ong Wing for the distinction
between the Constitution's bar on governmental abuse that violates
substantive due process and "the power of congress to protect, by
summary methods, the country from the advent of aliens.., or to
expel such if they have already found their way into our land, and un-
matic repercussions.").
214 Binh Phan v. Reno, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1155 (W.D. Wash. 1999) (emphasis in original).
215 Id. at 1155-56 ("[D]etention threatens the deprivation of a fundamental liberty interest
and thus dearly triggers 'heightened, substantive due process scrutiny,' not judicial defer-
ence.") (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 316 (1993) (O'Connor,J.. concurring)).
216 See Motomura, supra note 32, at 449-50 (suggesting that the plenary power doctrine is in
decline and that this trend is "best understood as a function of the tension in immigration cases
between constitutional doctrine and statutory interpretation").
217 See Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation's Last Stronghold" Race Discimmalion and the Consiztutional
Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L REV. 1 (1998) (arguing that the isolation of immigration policy
from effective judicial review is a product of the outdated and unacceptable principles of the
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), era and should thus be abandoned); see also Stephen H.
Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenai. Congressional Pouvx 1984 SUP. CT. RE'. 255
(arguing that the Court's allegiance to the plenary power doctrine in the area of immigration is
a result of"misconceived doctrinal theory" and should be abandoned). In a similar vein. Nancy
Morawetz has argued that plenary power does not justify the retroactivity provisions of IIRIRA
in the face of substantive due process doctrine. See Nancy Morawem Rrhinhng Rzada'te Depor-
tation Laws and theDue Proces Clause, 73 N.Y.U. L REV. 97 (1998).
218 185 F.3d 279, 295-96 (5th Cir. 1999).
219 Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
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lawfully remain therein."' ° The language replaced by the court's el-
lipsis is omitted with good reason; the original sentence is at odds
with the Constitution's present state of evolution but also with our
contemporary standards of moral decency. The original, unedited
sentence in Wong Wing itself read:
No limits can be put by the courts upon the power of congress to protect,
by summary methods, the country from the advent of aliens whose race or
habits render them undesirable as citizens, or to expel such if they have al-
221ready found their way into our land, and unlawfully remain therein.
That the Zadvydas court omitted this language is not surprising.
That we continue to allow for the reliance upon so outmoded a doc-
trine is.
The judges of the Binh Phan court looked past this outmoded
formalism to address the underlying constitutional norms at stake.
They refused to surrender their role of protecting constitutional
rights to the nebulous tentacles of plenary power. In doing so, the
court has vindicated the representation reinforcing theory, which has
historically insisted on the protection of minority interests in the face
of majoritarian hostility. As the representational reinforcing analysis
suggests, indefinite detention of removable criminal aliens strikes
discord with fundamental American principles in legalistic, theoreti-
cal, and even practical terms.2 2 2
IV. LEGAL REALISM OR LEGAL FICTION: THE NATURE OF LAW AND THE
SUPREME COURT'S CHOICE IN ZADVYDAS
The Supreme Court faces a clear choice in its consolidated Zadvy-
das case, to be decided sometime during the October 2000 term. The
unique and factually complex situation that lifers find themselves in
has no clearly correct legal answer. Neither of the two viable alterna-
tives reaches the legally "correct" result for these detainees.2 On the
Zadt'das, 185 F.3d at 296.
22 Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 237 (emphasis added).
Indefinite detention is maintained at great cost to American taxpayers. The INS estimates
that each detainee costs the United States approximately $55 per day. See Malone, supra note
13, at IA.
22 Arguably, the two cases before the Court in this consolidated grant of certiorari are not
inconsistent. The facts of Zadvydas are so unique as to provide ample opportunity for the Court
to distinguish it from other, more common lifer scenarios. For instance, because of Mr. Zadvy-
das's situation as a "stateless man," see Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279, 291-94 (5th Cir.
1999), the Fifth Circuit imagined possibilities for deportation that had not yet been pursued by
the INS. These included different theories on which to base claims of Lithuanian, German,
and Russian citizenship, all arising from Zadvydas's tortured, ambiguous family history. Id. By
finding these new possibilities, the court at once avoided the necessity of terming Mr. Zadvy-
das's imprisonment "indefinite" and resurrected the "raison d'etre" of the detention. In short,
the court unearthed what it believed to be unexhausted avenues of deportation and therefore
continued justification for detention. "We hold that the government may detain a resident
alien based on either danger to the community or risk of flight while good faith efforts to effec-
tuate the alien's deportation continue and reasonable parole and periodic review procedures
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one hand, a lifer's release into the United States on immigration pa-
role is in tension with her final order of deportation. On the other,
prolonged, indefinite detention without criminal conviction and
supported only by a vacuous administrative purpose contradicts our
basic notions of liberty for all persons within our borders. That so
many federal courts have reached such widely ranging results bears
out the complexity of the lifers' predicament. As shown above, either
opposing position can be supported with ample logic and vigor, a tru-
ism that might be said for much of constitutional law. Yet, while con-
stitutional methodology provides no one overwhelming result, the
Court is faced with a clear choice. The Court can choose to give
force to narrow legal fictions that fail to account for this unique situa-
tion, or the Court can choose to acknowledge the human side of its
substantive due processjurisprudence. In turn, the true nature of law
will be borne out is law to serve the needs of real people, or is it only
a set of wooden rules to be followed and manipulated for their own
sake?
A. Defining the Lifer's Interest
The starting point for the Court will be the characterization of the
lifer's interest which is crucial, because the constitutional framework
used is contingent upon it. As a matter of common sense, the lifer's
interest is in her freedom; however, courts have manipulated this ba-
sic idea to fit their desired result.
The Zaddas position2 reveals that the Fifth Circuit turns a blind
eye to the suffering of the petitioner, instead invoking legalisms that
gloss over the liberty actually at stake. From this perspective, the
lifer's interest is identified as the right to be paroled in the United
States, rather than the more fundamental right to be at liberty. -'
This argument was expressed most overtly by the majority in Duy Dac
Ho v. Greene.- The Duy Dac Ho court acknowledged both sides of this
are in place." Id. at 297. The court does not address the question of continued detention when
no such unexhausted avenues exist, removing the possibility of good faith efforts. It is this lat-
ter scenario which exists for the vast majority of lifers, epitomized by the case with which Zaduy-
das is consolidated. Kim Ho Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2000). In this %%ay. if the Su-
preme Court so chooses, it could reasonably hold that the Zadtrdas frameuork, by its o-%n
terms, would allow for the release of the majority of lifers.
2 See Binh Phan v. Reno, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1154-55 (W.D. Wash. 1999) (noting that '[ajs
a general rule, governmental invasions of fundamental liberty interests are subject to strict scru-
tint_ review").
This term will be used to describe all arguments that support or are in accord with the
Fifth Circuit's decision in Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 1999).
226 See id. at 289 (disagreeing with petitioner's claim that "his detention amounts to punish-
ment without trial, and thus violates his substantive due process liberty interest).
W Duy Dac Ho v. Greene, 204 F.3d 1045, 1058 (10th Cir. 2000) (noting that if the petition-
ers were granted the relief they sought, they would be granted 'te right to be at large in the
United States").
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coin, preferring the former. "Although the petitions could be char-
acterized as requests to be released from incarceration, the relief they
seek is indistinguishable from a request to be readmitted to this
country, albeit temporarily, until their return to Vietnam can be ef-
fectuated.
'2 8
Both the Duy Dac Ho dissente2 and the district court cases that are
in accord with it illustrate that the outcome of the due process
analysis is different when the court chooses the equally defensible po-
sition of characterizing the lifer's interest as the right to be at liberty.
While logic allows for either of these characterizations to stand, the
Court will face a clear choice in deciding which way to characterize it.
B. Establishing a "Reverse Entry Fiction"?
From the perspective of lifers, the most troubling aspect of the
Zadvydas position is its lumping together of the substantive due proc-
ess rights of excludable and removable aliens. It is this legal maneu-
ver atop which the Zadvydas decision stands and upon which its rea-
soning is entirely contingent. Close analysis reveals that this
argument manipulates a narrow legal fiction in order to justify its ul-
timate conclusion that removable aliens should be without meaning-
ful substantive due process rights.
The entry fiction was created in order to allow aliens whose legal
status does not permit entry into the United States to be admitted in
order to avoid literally holding them at the border."' Their legal
status remains unchanged, however, retaining the notion that they
are standing at our gates, awaiting entry. 32 The basis for this fiction is
that the alien is considered to be still at our border, without having
gained entry or any of the constitutional privileges that come with it.
This comports with a basic tenet of the plenary power doctrine that
the request to be admitted into our country is a privilege and not a
right. Both because excludable aliens have no right to be admitted
into the United States, and because their status of being outside our
border leaves them beyond the cloak of constitutional protection,
courts have allowed for their prolonged detention.
The court in Zadvydas inverts this logic to create, in effect, a re-
verse entry fiction or an exit fiction. It argues that once a lifer's final
228 Id.
M Id. at 1060, 1062 (Brorby,J., dissenting) (concluding that the Petitioners are asserting a
fundamental liberty interest).
230 See, e.g., Binh Phan v. Reno, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1154 (W.D. Wash. 1999) (rejecting as too
narrow the government's argument that the Petitioners seek only the right to be released into
the United States pending deportation and, instead, characterizing that interest as a "funda-
mental liberty interest in being free from incarceration"); see also supra text accompanying notes
124-35.
231 See, e.g., Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1387 (10th Cir. 1981).
232 Id.
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order for deportation has been completed, that alien, too, stands le-
gally outside our borders, despite her physical presence in the United
States and her previous status as a constitutionally protected alien. '
When a former resident alien is... finally ordered deported, the deci-
sion has irrevocably been made to expel him from the national commu-
nity. Nothing remains but to effectuate this decision. The need to expel
such an alien is identical, from a national sovereignty perspective, to the
need to remove an excludable alien who has been finally and properly
ordered returned to his country of origin!T m
With this language, the Zadv'das court joins together the constitu-
tional fate of excludable and removable aliens. In doing so, the court
must maneuver around two major obstacles. First, the court must ar-
gue that the final order of deportation takes the lifer outside of our
borders. Second, the Fifth Circuit must find support for the notion
that a removal order strips an alien of her previously-held constitu-
tional protection and the derivative right to claim a valid liberty in-
terest. Neither of these propositions can claim support in our courts'
federal jurisprudence.
First, the Zadvydas position argues that a final order of removal
takes an alien outside of our borders. "  Yet, the inquiry for constitu-
tional protection has always been physical presence within our bor-
ders. There is a long and venerable line of case law granting substan-
tive due process rights to aliens who gain physical entry into the
United States.s6 The seminal case in this area is Plyler v. Doe,- estab-
lishing that "[a]liens, even aliens whose presence in this country is
unlawful, have long been recognized as 'persons' guaranteed due
process of law by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. "r " What is
important for this analysis is not the legal status of the alien, as the
Zadzgdas decision suggests by placing emphasis on the effect of the
final order of deportation, but rather the fact that the alien has
gained entry into the United States and is now physically present
s Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279, 295-96 (5th Cir. 1999).
SId. at 296.
MId. at 295-96; see also Duy Dac Ho v. Greene, 204 F.3d 1045. 1058 (10h Cir. 2000) (tic
purported liberty interests at stake in these cases, therefore. are most appropriately viewed from
the perspective of an alien who has sought but been denied initial entry into this coun-
See, ag., Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (concluding that 'll per-
sons within the territory of the United States are entitled to the protection guarantied [sic] by
[the Fifth and Sixth] [A]mendments"); -ick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356. 369 (18S6) (ruling
that the due process and equal protection provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment "are uni-
versal in their application to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, %ithout regard to any
differences of race, of color, or nationality"); see also libng nig, 163 U.S. at 242 (Field.J.. con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) ('The term 'person' used in te fifth amendment... is
broad enough to include any and every human being uithin the jurisdiction of te republic. A
resident, alien born, is entitled to the same protection under the laws that a citizen is entitled
to.")
457 U.S. 202 (1982).
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 210.
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here. The removable alien's constitutional status is thus different
from the excludable alien who, because of the operation of the entry
fiction, is deemed to be still outside the United States seeking entry.
The Zadvydas court cannot accept the operation of the entry fiction
inasmuch as it allows excludable aliens to become available for the
purposes of analogy, and then forget that this same fiction holds
these people outside of our borders. Yet, this is exactly how the Zad-
vydas position proceeds.
Second, the Fifth Circuit argues that this removal order also strips
the alien of the constitutional rights that she previously enjoyed. The
Hoang Manh Nguyen court reveals the vulnerability of this legal ma-
neuvering. "This court is not persuaded by [Zadvydas] that a final
order of deportation erases any rights a permanent resident alien
previously possessed .... [G]iven that resident aliens have acknowl-
edged constitutional rights, we cannot make those rights vanish by
the legal expedient of a final order of deportation."39
With their physical presence here, excludable aliens, complete
with the lack of due process rights necessitated by this legal fiction,
have become available for the Zadvydas court to use for analogy. To
do so, however, ignores the fundamental notion upon which the en-
try fiction rests: these aliens have never gained entrance to our bor-
ders. By manipulating the entry fiction with its own unsupported line
of argument, the Zadvrydas position exploits the wooden rules of law
at the cost of neglecting actual human suffering. Even if the Su-
preme Court rejects the Kim Ho Ma construction of IIRIRA, which in-
fers a reasonableness limitation in the language of the statute, it may
still find that indefinite detention violates the Constitution's promise
of due process. Indeed, close analysis of the Zadvydas position illus-
trates that no other contention is supported by our history, our juris-
prudence, or our shared sense of decency to those within our bor-
ders.
CONCLUSION
The dilemma of lifers has existed for decades. The Court has now
risen to the constitutional challenge it presents, but only after it was
so jarringly introduced into the popular conscience with acts of des-
peration inside the walls of our prisons. In doing so, the Court will
squarely face an administrative context where Congress's statutory
authorization of agency action raises human rights concerns so grave
as to be constitutional in scope. The Kim Ho Ma Court gives Congress
the benefit of the doubt, offering a construction of the statute that
239 Hoang Manh Nguyen v. Fasano, 84 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1110 (S.D. Cal. 2000) (citing Thien
Van Vo v. Greene, 63 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1283 (D. Colo. 1999)). See also Duy Dac Ho, 204 F.3d at
1061 (Brorby, J., dissenting) (referring to this line of argument as an "unsupported conclu-
sion").
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does not allow for indefinite, non-penal detention. The question re-
mains, however: what if this brand of governmental cruelty is pre-
cisely what Congress intended to allow?
The United States owes a duty to its legal permanent residents. In
granting them such a status, the nation has invited them to the con-
stitutional table. Despite the lifer's crimes, for which she has already
been fully punished, the government has benefited from her pres-
ence as a contributing member of society. The Court's duty is to
make the constitutional promise equally meaningful for all who par-
ticipate in its burdens. The Court's choice is between equally plausi-
ble interpretations of the Constitution that iwill help us to understand
the most basic functions of law itself. Will we endorse a wooden set of
rules and the manipulation ofjudicially created legal fictions tow -ard
the end of law's existence for its own sake? Or will we choose an in-
terpretation of the Constitution that relieves needless human suffer-
ing and allows restrictions on human liberty only to the narrowest ex-
tent necessary to achieve realizable governmental interests? Nestor
Campos, a lifer suffering intolerable conditions at a local prison in
Louisiana recounts that "[t]he guards used to tell me 'You'll be here
until you're dead.'"'2 4 Is it possible that the Court could allow this
purgatory to continue? For the sake of Nestor Campos, let us hope
not.
240 HuMAN RIGHTS VATCH, LOCKED AWAY: IMMIGRATION DET.NEES IN JLS LN TIHE UrrED
STATES (Sept. 1998), hup://iww%.hn,.org/reports98/us-iminig/InsgS-O5.htun (reporting on a
Human Rights Watch interview with lifer Nestor Campos in ie Orleans Parish Prison. New Or-
leans, Louisiana).
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